We examine network formation via bilateral trade agreement (BTA) among three symmetric countries. Each government decides whether to form a link or not via a BTA depending on the differential of ex-post and ex-ante sum of real wages in the country. We model the governmental decision in two forms, myopic and farsighted and analyze the effects on the BTA network formation. First, we find that both myopic and farsighted games never induce the formation of star networks nor empty networks. Second, the networks resulting from myopic game coincides with those resulting from farsighted games. 
Introduction
In the last decades, developments in information and transportation technology have made it faster to cover the distance between any two countries and smoothened the contract of various transactions. We have also observed the number of trade agreements among countries increase rapidly. Each trade agreement drastically reduces the explicit and implicit trade barriers, such as tariff and administration costs.
While developments in technology are exogenous to governments, conclusion of trade agreements is based on governmental decision. The decisions of trade agreements are totally endogenous for each government. As is pointed out by Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) , decentralized decisions among multiple countries result in "building blocs" or " stumbling blocs". When the negotiations of free trade agreements (FTA) are decentralized, the ability of government to foresee the future networks would be critical. While there are several papers on FTA, most of the papers are based on competitive framework. This paper constructs a monopolistic competition model involving three symmetric countries with positive transportation costs to examine endogenous trade agreements. The geographical unit can be country, international regions or intranational regions if we could assume the immobility of workers. For example, three regions can be referred as Asia, North America, and EU. When reduction of trade costs results in a lower price of goods, it increases domestic welfare unambiguously.
However trade agreements among the other countries could deteriorate the welfare at home. The decentralized conclusions of trade agreements could be interpreted as a network formation game. Furusawa and Konishi (2007) analyze network formations among many heterogeneous countries with respect to stability but, the degree of farsightedness is not analyzed. In the study on strategic behavior of governments, while Mukunoki and Tachi (2006) employ Cournot competition model with infinite time, we employ monopolistic competition in finite time. Since BTA requires substantial reduction in trade barriors, the number of BTA concluded between countries is at most finite. Krugman (1993a) noted the limitation of a-twocountry framework and emphasized the role of hubs which he alternatively called star links. With the models of monopolistic competition, for example, by Ago, Isono and Tabuchi (2006) , Behrens (2007) , Mori and Nishikimi (2002) , and Behrens, Gaigne, Ottaviano and Thisse (2006) , the emergence of hub and its effects are analyzed in international economics and in economic geography. However, the endogenous determination of trade agreements is still left aside. This paper explicitly considers the effects from changes in trade network on distribution of firms and characterize the behavior of governments as welfare-maximizing with respect to vision, myopic or farsighted in a three-stage game.
Our simple model show that regardless of vision or foresight, a complete network is achieved. While Krugman (1993b) discussed that "world welfare is minimised when there are three blocs", our results imply optimistic ex-post path to this discussion. Even though world trading blocs are formed into three and minimizes the world welfare, three blocks will achieve the free trade world in the the end regardless of government vision.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we present the basic framework of the model, while Section III formulates the types of government behavior and compare the outcomes. Finally, we offer some concluding comments.
The model

Consumers and firms
The economy consists of three countries A, B, and C, where the geographical unit can be international regions or intranational regions. For simpler argument, we call the unit as country. There are two types of production sectors, the competitive and manufacturing sectors. In order to highlight the role of government behavior in the following section, three countries are assumed to be symmetric in population, endowments and technology. We normalize each population, the number of firms, and the amount of capital as one. Then the number of firms in each country is identical to the share of firms in this economy. We put the share of firms in country r by λ r ∈ [0, 1] and from definition, ∑ r=A,B,C λ r = 1 always holds. Each individual supplies one unit of labour inelastically within their residential country and is assumed to be endowed one unit of capital. Their consumption behavior is characterized by the following utility function as,
where M stands for an index of the consumption of the manufactured good, σ is the elasticity of substitution between any manufactured goods, and the lower subscript, r, expresses the country of consumption or production. 
where Y , w, k, p (v) and P denote income, wage, capital reward, price of a manufactured good indexed v and the price index of manufactured varieties. A worker in country r maximizes utility in (1) , subject to the budget constraint (2). Standard utility maximization yields the following equations;
V r is the indirect utility function in country r. The competitive sector produces a homogeneous good under constant returns to scale technology using labor only.
This homogeneous good is assumed to be shipped costlessly. Thus we take this as numeraire and normalize the labour wage one, w r = 1. On the other hand, the manufacturing sector requires one unit of capital as fixed input and labor as marginal input requirement and exhibits increasing returns to scale. We set the cost function of the manufacturing sector as π r + m r (v) , where π r is the rental cost for one unit of capital in country r and m r is the sum of national demands of a differentiated good, m r (v) = ∑ 3 s=1 m rs (v) . Taking the demand of its good as given, each firm sets its price so as to maximize its profit as
In equilibrium all varieties are symmetric. Thus we could drop the variety index (v) for simpler notation. With the normalizations, we could rewrite the price index as,
Since capital is used only for the fixed input and potential entrants in this sector ensure the zero-profit condition, rents to capital is expressed as a form of operating profits:
Capital moves to the country which gives the highest returns denoted by π r (λ r ).
This results in a firm distribution which signifies that the capital rent is identical in all countries in equilibrium. The equilibrium condition implies the following motion of capital arbitrage;
Then national income is shown to be invariant to the distribution of firms and simply written as Y r = π + w.
Trade agreements
We assume that the conclusion of trade agreements unambiguously decreases trade costs, which is expressed by δ > 1. As mentioned in the introduction, in the post-BTA scenario transportation costs would remain. The reduction of trade costs is evaluated by the level of ex-ante total trade costs which includes transportation costs. Since the measure of trade costs ranges from zero to one, φ ∈ [0, 1], even after the conclusion, the improved trade costs should not exceed one.
Then we regard the process to construct a trade agreement as a network formation. In what follows, we call the situation about the conclusion of trade agreements is denoted simply as network, which is expressed as an undirected graph on {A, B, C}(we can also identify it with a subset of the set of links {AB, BC, CA} 1 ).
Given a network g, a transportation cost between country r and s is denoted by φ g rs , and hence we have
Similarly, we denote the share of firms for country r given a network g by λ g r . Let
With the above notation, we can obtain the capital rent for each country r given a network g, π r (λ g ), as Moreover, we define the objective function of the government, social welfare, of each country r as the indirect utility function of all residents in the country and it may be written as
Considering the symmetry assumption among the three countries given a particular population, since wage and capital rent are equal among the countries, the national (regional) incomes are identical. Thus, without loss of generality, we drop the sub- 
Note that the decision on the approval of BTA by country r depends on the value of ∆ 
Vision of government
Now, we introduce a simple dynamic game for conclusion-network formation by national government. Suppose that countries A, B and C are facing situations to determine which BTA to conclude. Every country is concerned only with its own social welfare. In order to maximize its own social welfare, each government organizes conferences to discuss the reduction of trade barriers by BTA. In this game, we focus only on bilateral conferences and later discuss multilateral conference case. Each conference has to conclude at most one BTA between participants.
We assume decisions are irreversible so that all countries decide their own actions without considering the break of connected links.
For further understanding, we specify a word, "Conference". "Conference" is defined as a meeting to consult about forming a link between two participating governments, which represent the end points of the link. The conference on forming link X is denoted by Conference X for X = AB, BC, CA. In order to clarify the difference of these networks from the outcome network, we refer to a network formed on the way as "en route network". In addition, we suppose that the welfare of each country is not transferable. Hereon, we consider and compare two types ofvision of governments: myopic and farsighted.
Myopic games
First, we consider the case that all governments of countries are myopic decision makers: we suppose that participants of each conference take into account only how their payoffs change when they link, not how those finally change after all conferences. We denote the conclusion-network formation game with myopic governments by Γ M (φ, δ). In our paper, we simply call Γ M (φ, δ) the "myopic game" for (φ, δ).
By the above setup, we can assert the result of every conference with each change of the participant's social welfare by forming a link: a conference makes a conclusion to link only if both the welfares of the participants are strictly improved; otherwise it decides not to link. Moreover, any conference does not make a conclusion once 
Proposition 1 Suppose all the governments of countries make choices myopically, then the outcome network is always complete.
Therefore, star networks can not be formed due to the fact that there is always Pareto improvement for region C and A from the conclusion of {CA} under {AB, BC}.
Farsighted games
Next, we consider the case that all governments are farsighted decision makers:
we suppose that they take into account the social welfares gains after all conferences.
Therefore, they make actions thinking over how their actions affect the subsequent conferences, so that we need to specify the optimal strategy for each country by backward induction. We denote the conclusion-network formation game with farsighted governments by Γ F (φ, δ). In our paper, we simply call Γ F (φ, δ) the "farsighted game" for (φ, δ).
In order to simplify the discussion, we use the following scenario tree as in Figure   2 . With the scenario tree, we analyze the outcomes of the dynamic games comparing it with those of the myopic games. Since we proved that the outcome network in a myopic game can be the complete network {AB, BC, CA} , we consider all the farsighted profiles (φ, δ) at once. When the outcome network is complete in
, by symmetry, each conference must conclude to link whichever en route network it faces in Γ F (φ, δ). Hence, the outcome network in Γ F (φ, δ) is also complete. This is the case that strategically avoiding from ending as a star network by the others, any of two governments agree to conclude BTA for any given en route network. Summarizing the above, we conclude by the following proposition.
Proposition 2
The outcome of the farsighted game Γ F (φ, δ) is also the complete network.
Discussion and Conclusion
In the process of growing trade networks, we examine pairwise improvements of trade costs among three countries via bilateral trade agreements. We extensively analyze the different outcome networks depending on government vision. In the previous section, we show that myopic and farsighted games never induce a star network and that for any (φ, δ), the myopic game and farsighted game yields the complete network. Our results suggest an optimistic view to Krugman's discussion that free trade among varioous countries in the world will be achieved regardless of the vision of governments, even though the world is divided into three symmetric FTA-regions which gives the worst social welfare.
A.1.3 When the network has only one link
Let i, j and k be distinct countries. Suppose that a BTA is concluded only between countries i and j. Applying the capital arbitrage condition, the solution for the distribution of firms are given by
Note that although λ . Equating to zero, we have the critical value for this corner solution,
is always zero. This result is illustrated in Figure 1. 
A.1.4 When the network is a star network with two links
Suppose that BTAs are concluded between countries i and j and between countries j and k. Let i, j and k distinct.
As is the same procedure for A.1.2, we obtain the solution for the distribution of firms by,
Restriction in the parameter, δφ < 0, allows us to keep the variable of interest in the reasonable range, λ 
A.2 Welfare
Using the above results, (12) and (13), we obtain welfare and decision criteria for each country at each phase as in Table 1 Finally, the outcome network of Γ F (φ, δ) is also always complete.
